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[S.F. No. 21503. In Bank. Dec. 12, 1963.] 
RAYMOND LEROY KOPF, Cross-complainant and Appel-
lant, v. H. O. :MILAM et al., Cross-defendants and Re-
spondents. 
r1] Appeal-Record-Judgment Roll-Matters Reviewable.-
'Where un appeal on the clerk's tran~cript and certain ex-
hibits is treated as an appeal on the judglllent roll, the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to support the findings is not open to 
question. 
f2] Brokers-Licenses-Partnership.-A real estate brokerage 
partnership must be licensed and may becolllc so l'ither by se-
curing a partnership license or by securing licl'l\ses for all of 
its individual partners; the Real E~tate Law (Bus & Prof . 
Code, §§ 10000-10221) does not prohibit iudi l"idunlly licensed 
real e"tate brokers from acting in partnership without a sep-
arate license. 
[3] Id.-Actions for Compensation-Presumptions-Acceptability 
of Purchaser.-\Vhen a vendor enters a valid unconditional 
contract of sale of realty with a purcha~er procured by a 
broker, the purchaser's acceptahility is concluiiively pre~ullled 
because the vendor is estopped to deny the qualifications of a 
r2] Sl'e Cal.Jur.2d, Brokers, § 8; Am.Jur., Brokers (1st ed § 8). 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § ;j14(;j); [2] 
Brokers, § 5; [3] Brokers, § 142; [4] Brokers, § 101; [5] Brokers, 
§ 53. 
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purchaser with whom he is willing to contract. 
[4] Id.-Compensation-As Dependent on Consummation of Trans-
action.-When a contract for the sale of real property is con-
ditional, the broker's commission is not earned if the condition 
is not performed. 
[5] Id.-Compensation-As Dependent on Contract of Employment 
-Construction of Contract.-_-\. clause in a contract for the 
sale of real property making the contract "subject to Buyers 
assuming an existing loan" was a condition, not a promise, 
which had to be fulfilled before the real estate broker would 
be entitled to his commission where the note evidencing the 
loan provided that if any change were made in the title to the 
property, the holder of the note could forthwith declare the 
entire principal amount of over $50,000 due and payable; in 
view of this drastic consequence to both parties and the con-
ditional language used by them, it was reasonable to conClude,' 
that they intended to make the sale contingent on the pur-
chasers' obtaining the approval of the holder of the note 
before any change in title to the property. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Marin County. N. Charles Brusatori, Judge. Affirmed. 
, 
Cross-action to recover a real estate commission. 
ment for cross-defendants affirmed. 
Judg-; 
Howard B. Crittenden, Jr., for Cross-complainant and Ap-
pellant. 
Elliot W. Seymour for Cross-defendants and Respondents. 
TRA YNOR, J.-In this action for a real estate commis~ 
sion, cross-complainant, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, 
appeals from a judgment for cross-defendants, hereinafter 
referrcd to as defendants. [1] Thc appeal on the clerk's 
transcript and certain exhibits is treated as an appeal on the 
judgment roll (White v. Jones, 136 Cal.App.2d 567, 569 [288 
P.2d 913]), and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
findings is thercfore not open to question. 
Plaintiff sought to recover his commission on the ground 
that he had secured a purchaser after defC'ndants listed their 
property with him doing business as 'Vm. E. Doud & Co. The 
trial court found that "\Vm. E. Doud & Co. was a copartner-
ship consisting of plaintiff and one Hoffman. Although both 
plaintiff and Hoffman were licensed real estate brokers, the 
trial court found that they had not secured a separate part-
nership liccnse pursuant to the Real Estate Law. (Bus. & 
) 
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Prof. Code, §§ 10000-10221.) It also made findings against 
plaintiff on the merits. 
Section 101301 of the Business and Professions Code pro-
hibits any person from acting as a real estate broker without 
a license. Section 101362 provides that no pcrson may bring 
or maintain an action for a broker's commission without es-
tablishing that he was licensed when the cause of action 
arose. Section 100063 provides that "person" includes a co-
partnership. 
[2] Defendants contend that since a copartnership is a 
person and since aU persons must be licensed to act as bro-
kers, the partnership must be licensed as sneh to permit tht' 
partners to act as brokers on its behalf. Plaintiff concedes 
that a partnership must be licensed, but contends that it may 
become licensed either by securing a partnership license or by 
securing licenses for all of its partners. We agree with plain-
tiff's contention. 
When each member of a real estate brokerage partnership 
is a licensed broker no purpose would be served by requiring 
an additional license. Thus, whether an applicant for a real 
estate broker's license is an individual or a partnership, the 
issuance of a license depends on whether the applicant has 
the following three qualifications: good character and repu-
tation in the community,4 specified experience as a real estate 
salesman or education equivalent thereto,5 and the basic 
skills necessary to the transaction of a brokerage business.6 
When each member of a partnership is licensed as a broker, 
nothing more is required to qualify the firm for a license. It 
was for this reason that in Heinfelt v. Art", 135 Ca1.App. 
445 [27 P.2d 420], in construing the statute that formed the 
basis of the present code provisions, the court held that to 
1" It is unlawful for any person to engage in the business, act in the 
capacity of, advertise or assume to act as a real estate broker or a real 
estate salesman within this State without first oLtaining a real estate 
license from the division." 
2" No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a 
real estate broker or a real estate salesman within this State shall bring 
or maintain any action in the courts of this State for the collcdion of 
compensation for the performance of any of the acts mentioned in this 
article without alIeging and proving that he was a duly licensed real 
estate broker or real estate salesman at the time the alIeged cause of 
action arose. " 
8" 'Person' includes copartnership, corporation, company and firm." 
4Blls. & Prof. Code, §§ 10150, 1015!!. 
IiBu8. & Prof. Code, §10150.6. 
eBus. & Prof. Code, § 10153. 
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require a partnership liC'el1se in addition to individual li-
censes, whcn all the members of the partnership were li-
censed, "would accomplish nothing useful in carrying out 
the purpose of the act and would, in fact, call for merely a 
double licensc for persons whose qualifications have alrcady 
been favorably passed upon." (135 Cal.App. at p. 449.) 7 
The holding of the Heinlelt ease docs not render the provi. 
sions of the Real Estate Law governing partnership licenses 
superfluous. Those provisions were designed, not for firms in 
which all of tlle members are licenscd brokers, but for firms 
in which somc of the members will not act as brokers. Thus'i 
the only regulation in the California Administrative Code· 
that specifies a procedure for obtaining a partnership licellse 
explieitly applies only to partnerships in which not all of the 
members act as brokers. (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 10, § 2743.) 
Furthcrmore, section 10158 of the Real Estate Law assumes 
that thc partnership licensed is one in which some of the 
members will not act as brokers,s and this assumption also 
underlies the difference in the scope of sections 10152 and 
10153. The former empowers the Real Estate Commissioner 
to require proof of the good character and reputation of 
every member of the partnership, whereas the latter provides 
for an examination to test the skill of only" [those partners] 
through whom [the IJartnership] proposes to act" as a bro-
ker. Thus a partnership license is required so that the licens-
ing authorities may inquire into the integrity of a firm, some I 
of whose members are not engaged in brokerage activities. . 
Our conclusion that the Real Estate Law does not prohibit 
individually licensed brokers from acting in partnership 
without a sl'parate license finds added support from a com-
parison of the licensing requirements of the Business and 
Professions Code governing real estate brokers with those 
governing contractors. The Legislature used phraseology in 
sections 10130 and 10136 virtually identical with that used in 
!;ections 7028 and 7031, which respectively forbid any unli-
7Defendants contend that section 2740 of title 10 of the California 
Administrative Code, promUlgated after the Rein/elt decision, 80 
changes the Rcal E~tatc Law that that case should not be followed. 
Section 2i40, howcl'er, merely rephrased and consolidated sections 10158 
and 10159 of the Business and Professions Code, which were considered 
by the court in the rIcin/elt case. 
8" When a real estate license is granted to a copartnership, if it 
desires ally of its m~mbers other than the one or ones through whom it 
is already licensed to act as a real estate broker, it shnll procure 8ll 
additionalliceDse to 80 employ each of 8uch additional members." 
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censed "person" (which undcr sl,etiou 7025 includes an in-
dividual, a firm, topartlll'rship, corporation, association, or 
other organization, or any combination of any thereof) to 
engage in the busiuess 01' to act in the capacity of a contrac-
tor, or to bring or maintain allY aetion for compensation based 
on the transaction of suth business. These provisions were 
apparently 110t designed to prevent individually licensed con-
tractors from acting as a partnership, for the Legislature 
expressly provided in section 7029 that individually licensed 
contractors may not join forces without obtaining an addi-
tional joint license. If sections 7028 and 7031 are construed 
as prohibiting such action then section 70~9 is rcdundant. 
Since it appears that the Legislature did not regard sections 
7028 and 7031 as prohibitillg individually licensed contrac-
tors fro111 acting jointly and since those sections correspond so I 
closely to sections 10130 and 10136, it is reasonable to con-
clude that the Legislaturc would have adopted a section com-
parable to section 7029 had it meant to prohibit individually 
licensed brokers from acting as a partnership. 'Ve hold that 
plaintiff may maintain this action, and we therefore reach 
the merits of his claim. 
Defendants appointed plaintiff and his partner exclusive 
agents to sell certain real property owned by defendants. The 
partners found two purchasers, and a deposit receipt agree-
ment embodying a contract of sale preparcd by plaintiff's 
partner was signed by defendants and by the purchasers. 
This agreement provided: "The total purchase price is 
Eighty Seven Thousand ($87.000) Dollars. The balance is to 
be paid within -- days from datc of acceptance hereof 
by Seller as follows: Subject to Buyers assuming an existing 
loan of approximately Fifty Eight 'rhousand ($58.000) Dol-
lars secured by first D/T and bearing 6 (six %) per cent in-
terest .... " 
The principal of the existing loan was in fact approxi-
mately $54,000 and was evidenced by a note held by the 
Bank of California, which provided, "In case any change is 
made in the title to all or any part of the property described 
in the deed of trust securing this note, the whole of said 
principal shall forthwith become due and payable at the elec-
tion of the holder of this note." The purchasers made a cash 
down payment into escrow, but for reasons not specified in 
the record, the transaction proceeded no further. Defendants 
elected not to keep any of the purchasers' money, and plain-
tiff received no commission. 
) 
Dec. 1963] KOPF v. MILAM 605 
l60 C.2<1 G00; :;:. Cul.Rl'tr. LB, ao7 1:'.2.1 aDO] 
--------
The trial court found that the clause "Subject to Buyers 
assuming an existing loan," was a condition made for the 
defendants' benefit; that the purchasers never undertook to 
aSSUllle the loan and were never ready, willing, and able to 
assume it or to perform the other conditions in the deposit 
receipt agreement; that defendants were at aU times pre-
pared to convey title to the property upon performance of 
the conditions; and that defendants were not estopped to 
deny that the purchasers wcre ready, willing and able to 
perform. 
Plaintiff's claim depends on whether the purchasers he 
produced were ready, willing, and financially able to per-
form. (E.g., JIleyer v. Scl[}{Jio, 80 Cal.App.2d 161, 164 [181 
P.2d 690].) [3] 'Whcn a YCl1<lor entcrs a valid uncondi-
tional contract of salc with a purchaser procurcd by a broker. 
the purclHlser's acceptability is cUlIclusi\,ply presumed be-
cause the ,'endor is est(lpped to dcny the qualifications of a 
purchaser with whom he is willing- to contract. (Se(' Edwards 
v. Billow, 31 Cal.~d 3;)0, 3:)9-3(jO [188 P.2d 748] and cases 
cited; McNamara v. Sfec/';/Ilfl11, 20~ Cal. 56!), 572-573 [262 P. 
297].) [4] 'When the coutl'act is cOlHlitiollal, howcver, the 
broker's commission is not earned if the condition is not 
performed. (Colton v. O'Brien, 217 Cal. 551, 553 [20 P.2d 
43] ; Wiseman Y. Ross, ~o~ Cal..App.~d 138, 142 [20 Cal.Rptr. 
565] ; see Britschui v. Jl cCall, 41 Cal.2d 138, 144-145 [257 
P.2d 977].) 
[5] Although tIle erucial clause in the contract, "Subject 
to Buyers assuming an existing loan," is couched in the 
language of condition, plailltiff, relying on asserted custom-
ary practice, eontt'I!c1s that the parties illtended the clause as 
a promise by the purchasers to assume the existing loan con-
currently with the execution of a deed by defendants. De-
fendants contend that the contract was contingent on thtl 
purchasers' establishing their financial ability by arranging 
with the Bank of California to assume the existing loan. 
A rf'ading of the contract in conjunction with the note 
evidencing the loan to be assumed supports defendants' in-
terpretation. The note provided that if any change werH 
made in the title to the property, the holder of the note could 
forthwith declare the {'ntire principal amount of owr $50,000 
due and payable. If th(' purchasers assumed this loan m('rely 
by accepting a deed so providing, both parties would im-
mediately subject thcmselves to liability for the entire princi-
pal of the loan. In view of this drastic consequence to both 
GOG PATTON v. LA BREE [60 C.2d 
partit's and thc conditional language used by them, the trial 
court could rcasonably conclude that they iutended to make 
the liale contingcnt on the purchasers' obtaining the approval 
of the hoWer of the note prior to any change in titlc to the 
property. (See UniversaZ SaZes Co/·p. v. California Press Co., ! 
20 Ca1.2d 751, 772 [128 P.2cl 665] ; Estate of Rule, 25 Ca1.2d 
1, 10-11 [152 P.2d 1003, 155 A.L.R. 1319]; 3 Witkin, Cali-
fornia Procedure, Appeal, § 89 (a).) Since the contract was 
conditional, no presumption of the purchasers' qualifications 
arises, and the finding of the trial court that they were not 
ready, willing, and able to perform is conclusive. 
The jUdgmcnt is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobri-
ner, J., and Peek, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January 
7,1£164. 
